Perspective (from Wikipedia):
Waterloo proved a decisive battle in more than one sense. Every generation in Europe up to the outbreak of the First World War looked back at Waterloo as the turning point that dictated the course of subsequent world history, seeing it in retrospect as the event that ushered in the Concert of Europe, an era characterised by relative peace, material prosperity and technological progress.[187][188] The battle definitively ended the series of wars that had convulsed Europe, and involved many other regions of the world, since the French Revolution of the early 1790s. It also ended the First French Empire and the political and military career of Napoleon Bonaparte, one of the greatest commanders and statesmen in history.[189][ah]
There followed almost four decades of international peace in Europe. No further major conflict occurred until the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Changes to the configuration of European states, as refashioned after Waterloo, included the formation of the Holy Alliance of reactionary governments intent on repressing revolutionary and democratic ideas, and the reshaping of the former Holy Roman Empire into a German Confederation increasingly marked by the political dominance of Prussia. The bicentenary of Waterloo prompted renewed attention to the geopolitical and economic legacy of the battle and to the century of relative transatlantic peace which followed.[190][191][192][ai]
Overview of the Battle (from Wikipedia):
Upon Napoleon’s return to power in March 1815, many states that had opposed him formed the Seventh Coalition and began to mobilise armies. Wellington and Blücher’s armies were cantoned close to the northeastern border of France. Napoleon chose to attack them separately in the hope of destroying them before they could join in a coordinated invasion of France with other members of the coalition. On 16 June, he successfully attacked the bulk of the Prussian army at the Battle of Ligny with his main force, while a portion of the French army simultaneously attacked an Anglo-allied army at the Battle of Quatre Bras. Despite holding his ground at Quatre Bras, the defeat of the Prussians forced Wellington to withdraw north to Waterloo on the 17th. Napoleon sent a third of his forces to pursue the Prussians, who had withdrawn parallel to Wellington in good order. This resulted in the separate and simultaneous Battle of Wavre with the Prussian rear-guard.
Upon learning that the Prussian army was able to support him, Wellington decided to offer battle on the Mont-Saint-Jeanescarpment across the Brussels road. Here he withstood repeated attacks by the French throughout the afternoon of the 18th, aided by the progressively arriving Prussians. In the evening, Napoleon committed his last reserves, the senior battalions of the French Imperial Guard infantry. The desperate final attack of the Guard was narrowly beaten back. With the Prussians breaking through on the French right flank, Wellington’s Anglo-allied army counter-attacked in the centre, and the French army was routed.
Analysis:
Upon reading through this historic event and analyzing it, it seems clear that Napoleon ought to have won the battle. Despite all the misfortunes that were suffered by the French army – the French were still in position to win the battle. Yet, the Allies managed to hold out, narrowly surviving the last attempt of the French until a defeated corps that was reorganized and recovered came to support them from seemingly nowhere. At the same time, a huge French force of 30,000 was detached due to a French Marshal whose loyalty to Napoleon was suspect. Additionally, there was widespread desertion of many in Napoleon’s army. To sum up, everything that could have gone wrong for Napoleon did go wrong – and even things that couldn’t go wrong for Napoleon also went wrong! (How can a defeated force come back and fight within 48 hours? And how can 30,000 French troops just go AWOL?) The lesson is that if God doesn’t want something to happen, then it won’t happen. God did not want Napoleon to be victorious, so the result was an unexpected and decisive Allied victory. (There was one battle where this providence was evident on an even greater scale – the French loss in Russia. To this day, historians cannot fully explain it. See post.)
Here are some of the acts of providence that changed the battle and caused the French defeat:
Acts of Providence that Determined that Outcome of the Battle:
The outcome of the battle was transformed by numerous acts of providence:
1. The Dutch army arrived at the precise time when Napoleon’s army was on the verge of victory:
Two batteries of Imperial Guard Horse Artillery accompanied them with sections of two guns between the squares. Each square was led by a general and Marshal Ney, mounted on his 5th horse of the day, led the advance.[156] Behind them, in reserve, were the three battalions of the Old Guard, right to left 1st/2nd Grenadiers, 2nd/2nd Chasseurs and 1st/2nd Chasseurs. Napoleon left Ney to conduct the assault.
Other troops rallied to support the advance of the Guard. On the left infantry from Reille’s corps that was not engaged with Hougoumont and cavalry advanced. On the right all the now rallied elements of D’Érlon’s corps once again ascended the ridge and engaged the Anglo-allied line. Of these, Pégot’s brigade broke into skirmish order and moved north and west of La Haye Sainte and provided fire support to Ney, once again unhorsed, and Friant’s 1st/3rd Grenadiers. The Guards first received fire from some Brunswick battalions, but the return fire of the grenadiers forced them to retire. Next, Colin Halket’s brigade front line consisting of the 30th Foot and 73rd traded fire but they were driven back in confusion into the 33rd and 69th regiments, Halket was shot and seriously wounded and the whole brigade retreated in a mob. Other Anglo-allied troops began to give way as well. A counterattack by the Nassauers and the remains of Kielmansegge’s brigade from the Anglo-allied second line, led by the Prince of Orange, was also thrown back and the Prince of Orange was seriously wounded. General Harlet brought up the 4th Grenadiers and the Anglo-allied center was now in serious danger of breaking.
It was at this moment that the timely arrival of the Dutch General Chassé turned the tide in favour of the Anglo-allied army.[157]Chassé’s relatively fresh Dutch division was sent against them, led by a battery of Dutch horse-artillery commanded by Captain Krahmer de Bichin. The battery opened a destructive fire into the 1st/3rd Grenadiers’ flank.[158] This still did not stop the Guard’s advance, so Chassé ordered his first brigade (Colonel Hendrik Detmers) to charge the outnumbered French with the bayonet; the French grenadiers then faltered and broke.[159] The 4th Grenadiers, seeing their comrades retreat and having suffered heavy casualties themselves, now wheeled right about and retired.[160]
2. The French marshals did not lead well. As the army took shape, French officers were allocated to units as they presented themselves for duty, so that many units were commanded by officers the soldiers didn’t know, and often didn’t trust. Crucially, some of these officers had little experience in working together as a unified force, so that support for other units was often not given. Close artillery support could disrupt infantry squares and allow cavalry to penetrate; at Waterloo, however, co-operation between the French cavalry and artillery was not impressive. The French artillery did not get close enough to the Anglo-allied infantry in sufficient numbers to be decisive.[120] Artillery fire between charges did produce mounting casualties, but most of this fire was at relatively long range and was often indirect, at targets beyond the ridge.
3. Numerous mistakes by the French. For reasons that remain unclear, no attempt was made to spike other Anglo-allied guns while they were in French possession. In line with Wellington’s orders, gunners were able to return to their pieces and fire into the French cavalry as they withdrew after each attack. After numerous costly but fruitless attacks on the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge, the French cavalry was spent.[y]
Marshall Ney led the Middle Guard on an oblique towards the Anglo-allied centre right instead of attacking straight up the centre. Napoleon sent Ney’s senior ADC Colonel Crabbé to order Ney to adjust, but Crabbé was unable to get there in time.
Additionally, with Wellington’s centre exposed by the fall of La Haye Sainte and the Plancenoit front temporarily stabilised, Napoleon committed his last reserve, the hitherto-undefeated Imperial Guard infantry. This attack, mounted at around 19:30, was intended to break through Wellington’s centre and roll up his line away from the Prussians. However, the guard remained in reserve and did not directly assault the Anglo-allied line.[154][ae]
4. The weather was disastrous for the French. Napoleon’s strategy was to conduct an offensive in order to destroy the allied armies before they were able to combine against him. However, the weather could not have been poorer for the offensive. The French army was forced to march through rain and black coal-dust mud to reach Waterloo, and then to contend with mud and rain as it slept in the open. Little food was available for the soldiers. Napoleon, with the reserves, made a late start on 17 June and joined Ney at Quatre Bras at 13:00 to attack Wellington’s army but found the position empty. The French pursued Wellington’s retreating army to Waterloo; however, due to bad weather, mud and the head start that Napoleon’s tardy advance had allowed Wellington, apart from a cavalry action at Genappe, there was no substantial engagement.
5. Waterloo was an incredible place to set up a powerful defense. The favorability towards the defense of this location cannot be overestimated. The Waterloo position was a strong one. It consisted of a long ridge running east-west, perpendicular to, and bisected by, the main road to Brussels. Along the crest of the ridge ran the Ohain road, a deep sunken lane. Near the crossroads with the Brussels road was a large elm tree that was roughly in the centre of Wellington’s position and served as his command post for much of the day. Wellington deployed his infantry in a line just behind the crest of the ridge following the Ohain road.[31]
Using the reverse slope, as he had many times previously, Wellington concealed his strength from the French, with the exception of his skirmishers and artillery.[31] The length of front of the battlefield was also relatively short at 2.5 miles (4.0 km). This allowed Wellington to draw up his forces in depth, which he did in the centre and on the right, all the way towards the village of Braine-l’Alleud, in the expectation that the Prussians would reinforce his left during the day.[32]
Both Hougoumont and Papelotte were fortified and garrisoned, and thus anchored Wellington’s flanks securely. Papelotte also commanded the road to Wavre that the Prussians would use to send reinforcements to Wellington’s position. On the western side of the main road, and in front of the rest of Wellington’s line, was the farmhouse and orchard of La Haye Sainte, which was garrisoned with 400 light infantry of the King’s German Legion.[33] On the opposite side of the road was a disused sand quarry, where the 95th Rifles were posted as sharpshooters.[34]
Wellington’s forces positioning presented a formidable challenge to any attacking force. Any attempt to turn Wellington’s right would entail taking the entrenched Hougoumont position. Any attack on his right centre would mean the attackers would have to march between enfilading fire from Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte. On the left, any attack would also be enfiladed by fire from La Haye Sainte and its adjoining sandpit, and any attempt at turning the left flank would entail fighting through the lanes and hedgerows surrounding Papelotte and the other garrisoned buildings on that flank, and some very wet ground in the Smohain defile.[35]
6. The timely arrival of another Allied squadron when the French were expecting Grouchy to support them instead! Throughout the late afternoon, Zieten’s I Corps had been arriving in greater strength in the area just north of La Haie. General Müffling, Prussian liaison to Wellington, rode to meet I Corps.
Zieten had by this time brought up his 1st Brigade, but had become concerned at the sight of stragglers and casualties from the Nassau units on Wellington’s left and from the Prussian 15th Brigade. These troops appeared to be withdrawing and Zieten, fearing that his own troops would be caught up in a general retreat, was starting to move away from Wellington’s flank and towards the Prussian main body near Plancenoit. Zieten had also received a direct order from Blücher to support Bülow, which Zieten obeyed and marched to Bülow’s aid.
Müffling saw this movement away and persuaded Zieten to support Wellington’s left flank.[146] Müffling warned Zieten that “The battle is lost if the corps does not keep on the move and immediately support the English army”.[147] Zieten resumed his march to support Wellington directly, and the arrival of his troops allowed Wellington to reinforce his crumbling centre by moving cavalry from his left.[146]
The French were expecting Grouchy to march to their support from Wavre, and when Zieten’s I Corps appeared instead, the disillusionment shattered French morale” and “the sight of Zieten’s arrival caused turmoil to rage in Napoleon’s army”.[148]
7. The mistake of Napoleon in committing his last reserves in an offensive. With Wellington’s centre exposed by the fall of La Haye Sainte and the Plancenoit front temporarily stabilized, Napoleon committed his last reserve, the hitherto-undefeated Imperial Guard infantry. This attack, mounted at around 19:30, was intended to break through Wellington’s centre and roll up his line away from the Prussians.
8. The wasted 33,000 soldiers led by Grouchy that were not there for the French when needed. Napoleon had ordered Grouchy, who commanded the right wing, to follow up the retreating Prussians with 33,000 men. A late start, uncertainty about the direction the Prussians had taken, and the vagueness of the orders given to him, meant that Grouchy was too late to prevent the Prussian army reaching Wavre, from where it could march to support Wellington. More importantly, the heavily outnumbered Prussian rear-guard was able to use the River Dyle to enable a savage and prolonged action to delay Grouchy. Napoleon had overestimated the extent of his victory at Ligny and underestimated the resilience of the Prussians. He also seems to have discounted the presence of Bülow’s substantial corps, which had not been in action at Ligny. Had Napoleon retained Grouchy’s 30,000 men as a guard for his right flank, it is likely that these troops could have held off the Prussians and allowed the rest of Napoleon’s army to attack Wellington’s army unmolested.
9. The incredible turnaround of a defeated army that was able to reorganize itself. After Ligny, the Prussian army, although defeated, was able to realign its supply train, reorganize itself, and intervene decisively on the Waterloo battlefield within 48 hours![30] Two and a half Prussian army corps, or 48,000 men, were engaged at Waterloo; two brigades under Bülow, commander of IV Corps, attacked Lobau at 16:30, while Zieten’s I Corps and parts of Pirch I’s II Corps engaged at about 18:00.
10. The treachery of Marshal General Jean-de-Dieu Soult. After the first abdication of Napoléon (1814), he declared himself a Royalist, received the Order of St. Louis, and acted as minister of war from 3 December 1814 to 11 March 1815. When Napoléon returned from Elba, Soult at once declared himself a Bonapartist, was made a peer of France and acted as chief of staff to the Emperor during the Waterloo campaign, in which role he distinguished himself far less than he had done as commander of an over-matched army.
It should be noted that massive mistakes by Soult during previous French campaigns had had weakened the French army considerably, and provided great morale to Wellington’s armies.
In 1810 he invaded Andalusia, which he quickly overran. However, because he then turned to seize Seville, the capture of Cádiz eluded him. He said, “Give me Seville and I will answer for Cádiz.”[5] This led to the prolonged and futile Siege of Cadiz, a strategic disaster for the French.
In 1812, after Wellington‘s great victory of Salamanca, Soult was obliged to evacuate Andalusia. In the subsequent Siege of Burgos campaign, Soult was able to drive Wellington’s Anglo-Allied army back to Salamanca. There, the Duke of Dalmatia, as Soult was now known, failed to attack Lord Wellington despite an 80,000 to 65,000 superiority of numbers, and the British army retired to the Portuguese frontier.[6] Soon after, he was recalled from Spain at the request of Joseph Bonaparte (who had been installed by his brother as King Joseph I of Spain) with whom, as with the other marshals, he had always disagreed.
In his book, Waterloo: The History of Four Days, Three Armies and Three Battles, Bernard Cornwell summarizes the opinions of several historians that Soult’s presence in the Army of the North was one of several factors contributing to Napoleon’s defeat, because of the animosity between him and Marshall Ney, the other senior commander, and because, in spite of his experience as a soldier, Soult lacked his predecessor Marshal Berthier‘s administrative skills. The most glaring instance of this was his written order, according to Napoleon’s instructions, to Marshal Grouchy to position his force on the British army’s left flank, to prevent reinforcement by their Prussian allies. Cornwell decries the wording of Soult’s order as “almost impenetrable nonsense”, and Grouchy misinterpreted the order and instead marched against the Prussian rearguard at Wavre.
Wellington, the beneficiary of some very fortuitous occurrences in this battle, had this to say when asked who was the greatest general of the day, answered: “In this age, in past ages, in any age, Napoleon”.[272]
