The Battle of the Marne

Introduction (from Wikipedia):

The Battle of the Marne (French: Première bataille de la Marne, also known as the Miracle of the Marne, Le Miracle de la Marne) was a World War I battle fought from 6–12 September 1914.^[1] It resulted in an Allied victory against the German armies in the west. The battle was the culmination of the German advance into France and pursuit of the Allied armies which followed the Battle of the Frontiers in August and had reached the eastern outskirts of Paris. A counter-attack by six French armies and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) along the Marne River forced the Imperial German Army to retreat northwest, leading to the First Battle of the Aisne and the Race to the Sea. The battle was a victory for the Allied Powers but led to four years of trench warfare stalemate on the Western Front.

The battle of the Marne was a major turning point of World War I. By the end of August 1914, the whole Allied army on the Western Front had been forced into a general retreat back towards Paris. Meanwhile, the two main German armies continued through France. It seemed that Paris would be taken as both the French and the British fell back towards the Marne River. The war became a stalemate when the Allied Powers won the Battle of the Marne. It was the first major clash on the Western Front and one of the most important events in the war. The German retreat left the Schlieffen Plan in ruins and Germany had no hope of a quick victory in France. Its army was left to fight a long war on two fronts.

Acts of Providence:

There were major acts of providence that caused the allied victory:

1. The sudden Grand Directive by von Moltke, changing the order of battle for the German attack. Von Moltke ordered that Paris would now be bypassed and the sweep intended to encircle the city would now seek to entrap the French forces between Paris and Verdun.^[10] To accomplish this, Bulow’s 2 Army would now become the primary striking force with von Kluck’s 1 Army following in echelon to protect the flank.^[11] 
2. It is extremely noteworthy that this change was due to the intercepting of a radio transmission. At the time of this Grand Directive, von Moltke based his decision off of an intercepted radio transmission from 2 Army to 1 Army describing the enemy retreating across the Marne. Had he not received this “helpful” bit of information, he would have proceeded with the original plans and the outcome of the battle would likely have been profoundly different.
3. The total lack of communication among the German forces. On the eve of this most important battle, von Moltke had requested situation reports from von Kluck’s 1 Army on 1 September, but received none.^[10]  At this time, von Moltke chose to reinforce the opposite wing that was attacking fortifications in the region near Verdun and Nancy.Von Kluck, whose army at the extreme wing had formerly been the force that would deliver the war winning blow, disregarded these orders. Together with his Chief of Staff General Kuhl, von Kluck ordered his armies to continue southeast rather than turning to the west to face possible reinforcements that could endanger the German flank. They would seek to remain the wing of the German attack and to find and destroy the French Fifth armies flank.^[12] After setting this order in action on 2 September, von Kluck did not transmit word to von Moltke and OHL until the morning of 4 September, which von Moltke chose not to respond to.^[12] Though in keeping with the pre-war traditions of independent field commanders controlling their armies without central oversight, von Kluck’s actions disregarded the threat to their west as they continued to drive South. On 31 August, 1 September and 3 September, German aviators reported columns of French troops to 1 Army’s west headed towards their flank. These reports were dismissed and not passed along to Gronau at IV Reserve Corps. Here the German armies’ lack of coordination and communication would terminally jeopardize the offensive.
4. The decision of the Allied forces not to evacuate. British Expeditionary Force (BEF) commander Sir John French began to make contingency plans for a full retreat to the ports on the English Channel followed by an immediate British evacuation. On 1 September Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, met with French (and French Prime Minister Viviani and War Minister Millerand), and ordered him not to withdraw to the Channel. The BEF retreated to the outskirts of Paris, before it counter-attacked in concert with the French, in the Battle of the Marne.^[6]  
5. The personality of French commander, Joffre to convince the British to support the French in the counterattack. (Marshal Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre (12 January 1852 – 3 January 1931), was a French general who served as Commander-in-Chief of French forces on the Western Front from the start of World War I until the end of 1916. He is best known for regrouping the retreating allied armies to defeat the Germans at the strategically decisive First Battle of the Marne in September 1914.) Joffre spent much of the afternoon on September 3, 1914, in silent contemplation under an ash tree.^[19] At dinner that night he received word of d’Esperey’s plan for counterattack. That night he issued commands to halt the French retreat in his Instruction general 5, with a start date of 6 September for the French counterattack. The next day Joffre spent much of the day confirming that the British would attack as planned. The BEF under Field Marshall John French were under no obligations to follow orders of the French. Joffre first attempted to utilize diplomatic channels to convince the British government to apply pressure on British Commander John French. Later in the day he arrived personally at British command to talk to French in person. This ended with Joffre banging his hand dramatically on a table while shouting “Monsieur le Marechal, the honour of England is at stake!” Following this meeting French agreed to the operational plan to commence the following day.^[20]
6. The decision to replace the defensive minded Fench General Charles Lanrezac with the offensive minded d’Esperey. D’Esperey would be the originator of the Entente operational plan during the Battle of the Marne. ^[15] Lanrezac was reluctant to counterattack, and additionally, he had a poor relationship with John French of the British. This would have severely limited the ability for a successful counterattack.
7. The incredibly large gap between the two German armies.  Von Kluck ignored the Franco-British forces advancing from the south against his left flank and opened a 50-kilometre (30 mi) gap in the German lines between the 1st Army and the 2nd Army on its left (east). Allied air reconnaissance observed German forces moving north to face the Sixth Army and discovered the gap.^[21] The lack of the coordination between von Kluck and Bülow caused the gap to widen further. The Allies were prompt in exploiting the break in the German lines, sending the BEF and the Fifth Army into the gap between the two German armies. The right wing of the Fifth Army attacked on 6 September and pinned the 2nd Army in the Battle of the Two Morins, named for the two rivers in the area, the Grand Morin and Petit Morin.
8.  The fact that the message from Joffre to delay the allied offensive for one day did not arrive in time. At 9.45 am on 4 September Gallieni, who had learned from Paris aviators the previous day that Kluck’s German First Army was marching south-east across Paris. He proposed through the first of a series of telephone calls conducted through aides – as Joffre would not come to the phone – to attack north of the Marne on 6 September or south of the Marne on 7 September.^[35][36][37] Joffre’s reply saying he preferred the southern option (which would take a day longer as it forced the Sixth Army to cross to south of the Marne, but would keep the Sixth Army and BEF from being separated by the river) arrived too late to reach Gallieni, who had left for a meeting with the BEF chief of staff, Archibald Murray. That same afternoon, Henry Wilson, the BEF sub-chief of staff, was negotiating separate plans with Franchet d’Espèrey, on the British right, which envisaged the Sixth Army attacking north of the Marne.^{[38][39][40][41]} In the absence of news from Franchet d’Espèrey, Joffre ordered Gamelin to draft orders for Maunoury to attack south of the Marne on 7 September. This intention was also passed on to Sir John French. While Joffre was having dinner with the British liaison officer, Sidney Clive, and two visiting Japanese officers, neither of whom appeared to understand a word of French, a message arrived from Franchet d’Espèrey saying that he would be ready to attack on 6 September. At this point Gallieni, who returned to Paris to find Joffre’s message from earlier in the day and a message from Wilson, insisted on speaking to Joffre personally on the telephone, informing him that it was too late to cancel the movement of Maunoury’s army. Joffre agreed to bring forward the Allied offensive to 6 September and to have the Sixth Army attack north of the Marne instead. The offensive thus began on 6 September. The right wing of the Fifth Army attacked and pinned the 2nd Army in the Battle of the Two Morins, named for the two rivers in the area, the Grand Morin and Petit Morin. The BEF advanced the same day, crossed the Petit Morin, captured bridges over the Marne, and established a bridgehead 8 kilometres (5 mi) deep. The Fifth Army by 8 September crossed the Petit Morin, which forced Bülow to withdraw the right flank of the 2nd Army. Next day the Fifth Army re-crossed the Marne, and the German 1st and 2nd Armies began to retire.^[26] See below, however, # 11 where the real benefit of attacking a day earlier is explained.
9. The miracle of the thousands of French reinforcements that appeared at the crucial moment to help deny the German hope to counterattack and smash the Sixth Army of the French. The Sixth Army was reinforced on the night of 7/8 September by 10,000 French reserve infantry ferried from Paris. This included about 3,000 men from the Seventh Division who were transported in a fleet of Paris taxicabs requisitioned by General Gallieni.
10. The failure of Von Moltke to issue any orders during the critical period of 6 to 7 September. (See #12 and #13 where Von Moltke’s subordinate issued the mind-numbing and illogical full retreat order which may have been possible only because of a lack of orders from Von Moltke at the most critical time. And then, Von Moltke was struck with a nervous breakdown after the retreat order from his subordinate, making any further orders impossible.)
11. Von Kluck or Bülow failed to provide any reports between 7 and 9 September.^[23]
12. The biggest miracle of all is the inexplicable order from the German high command to retreat. Historians do not fully understand why the command was given and how the command came to be given by someone not in position to make the decision. Von Kluck vigorously opposed the decision because he believed – likely correctly – that his army was on the verge of a breakthrough (despite all its mistakes). Wikipedia records it as follows: “Moltke, at OHL in Luxembourg, was effectively out of communication with the German army HQs. He sent his intelligence officer, Oberstleutnant Richard Hentsch to visit the HQs. On 8 September, Hentsch met with Bülow, and they agreed that the 2nd Army was in danger of encirclement and would retreat immediately. On 9 September, Hentsch reached the 1st Army’s HQ, met with von Kluck’s chief of staff, and issued orders for the 1st Army to retreat to the Aisne River.^[32] von Kluck and von Kuhl vigorously objected to this order as they believed their army was on the verge of breaking the Sixth Army. However, Hentsch reminded them he had the full power of the OHL behind him, and that 2nd Army was already in retreat. Von Kluck reluctantly ordered his troops to pull back.” In other words, Hentsch’s authority was based on the fact that he claimed to have the power of the German High Command, not actual authority! Furthermore, his argument was that they had already retreated so they should retreat further was non sensible! Also, the German army retreat (described in #8) was not a real retreat, but simply a fallback from a position where they would be vulnerable to a furious counterattack. The French had given their all but without really changing the situation at the front. The German army merely needed to regroup and march their armies together and were poised for a victory. However, this regrouping was used by Colonel (not General!) Hentsch as support for a continued and full-fledged retreat!
13. The nervous breakdown of General Moltke at the most critical time. To compound this act of providence that the German army should inexplicably retreat, General Moltke suffered a nervous breakdown upon hearing of the danger. This caused the retreat to continue instead of Moltke possibly stopping it and continuing the attack. It is very likely that Moltke, who was the superior to Hentsch – in fact, Hentsch was his subordinate – would simply override Hentsch who actually issued the retreat order without him! But his sudden nervous breakdown made him incapable of giving any overriding orders. So with the general out of the way, his subordinates took over and continued following Hentsch’s order to retreat to the Aisne, “to regroup for another offensive”. The Germans were pursued by the French and British, although the pace of the exhausted Allied forces was slow and averaged only 19 km (12 mi) per day. The Germans ceased their retreat after 65 km (40 mi), at a point north of the Aisne River, where they dug in, preparing trenches. By 10 September the German armies west of Verdun were retreating towards the Aisne. Joffre ordered Allied troops to pursue, leading to the First Battle of the Aisne. The German retreat from 9–13 September marked the end of the Schlieffen Plan. Moltke is said to have reported to the Kaiser: “Your Majesty, we have lost the war.” (Majestät, wir haben den Krieg verloren).^[34]